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Abstract In the areas of electronic identification and electronic

trust services, the Regulation No. 910/2014 of the European
Parliament and of the Council on electronic identification and
trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market
and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC (eIDAS) creates uniform
regulations for electronic signatures, seals, time stamps,
registered mail and website certificates in the European single
market. All developments that affect the security of signature
procedures have an impact. In this study, we consider the
candidates for quantum computer-resistant asymmetric
cryptographic (PQC) methods currently under investigation in
international research and standardization and evaluate their
suitability for PKI systems with a focus on long-term
preservation of evidential value, as is the case in particular with
eIDAS-compliant signature solutions. Based on an evaluation
system proposed by us - an adaptation of the system from [2] we compare the application requirements with the properties of
the candidates and recommend suitable methods.
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1

Introduction

This study focuses on quantum computer-resistant crypto methods, also called postquantum cryptography (PQC) after J.D. Bernstein (in particular in asymmetric
methods). It is not comprehensive and does not list every quantum computerresistant asymmetric method ever proposed. Instead, it lists a representative sample
(as of End 2020) of cryptographic techniques that are being discussed in academia,
are supported by currently active research teams, may be viable for real-world
applications, and are therefore suitable candidates for consideration by various
standardization organizations for standardization. Beyond NIST's PQC
standardization, we also consider extensions of classical algorithms as well as
quantum-assisted algorithms (i.e., the use of quantum technology to augment
classical systems, see also [10]) with respect to the possibility of providing sufficient
quantum computing resistance.
2

Overview of the procedures

In this study, we define PQC methods as cryptographic methods (in particular
asymmetric cryptographic methods) which, according to the current state of
research, can possibly provide sufficient security against attacks that use the
capabilities and properties of quantum computers, i.e. are "quantum computer
resistant". In this context, the procedures themselves do not use any support from
quantum computers for preparation and execution.
The underlying principle of continuing to use the previously employed public-key
methods such as RSA and ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) with
significantly larger keys than is currently customary in the post-quantum era is
obvious at first glance. On the one hand, the approach of increasing the key sizes of
RSA and ECDSA to cope with ever-improving cryptanalysis and newly discovered
attacks is already a tradition (see, e.g., evolution of NIST's SP 800-57 Part 1[11]). In
the context of quantum computers, this principle would very quickly lead to large
and unwieldy key sizes that corresponding keys might not be usable in practice:
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Quantum computers are based on the concept of qubits (quantum bit), where each
qubit exists simultaneously as a superposition (superposition or also called
coherence) of the states 1 and 0 and all those in between. The number of qubits
needed on a quantum computer to break RSA1 is estimated to be 2n+3 [12] and
2n+2 [13], which means that a quantum computer with about 4,000 qubits is needed
to break an RSA-2048 signature (further algorithm optimizations are expected, so
the actual number of qubits needed is expected to be lower). Shor's QFT algorithm
can also be adapted to solve the discrete logarithm problem. The number of qubits
to break ECDSA is "approximately" 6n [6]. This means that a quantum computer
with about 1,500 qubits can break an ECC-P256 signature. Following the
assumption of Neven's law [14] (the quantum equivalent of Moore's law), one can
estimate that the computational power of quantum computers increases at a "double
exponential rate" compared to classical computers.
If we start with 100 qubits in a given year and double the qubits every 18 months, 9
years later we will probably have computers with over 6000 qubits and in 32 years
we will be able to break a 1-million-bit RSA key. Post-qubit RSA (i.e., RSA with such
large key lengths) was studied by Bernstein [15], who showed the technical feasibility
of implementing a terabit key using 231 4096-bit primes as factors. At these key
sizes, each RSA operation amounted to tens or hundreds of hours. In practice, such
a system can thus probably be ruled out. It should be noted, incidentally, that postquantum RSA was in Round 1 of the NIST PQC competition but was not selected
for Round 2.
Currently, it is unclear how many qubits the most powerful quantum computers
have at the time of writing. The company IQM FINLAND OY is to build a quantum
computer which is to have 50-qubits by the end of the third phase in 2024 ([36]).
Google LLC, IBM, and others have developed machines with about 50 or more
high-quality qubits (see [34], [35]). IBM is planning (even faster than Neven's law
would suggest) more quantum computers with 127 qubits in 2021, 433 qubits in
2022, and over 1000 qubits in 2023 [35].

1

i.e. breaking any private key
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If IBM's development speed remains the same, we could expect the abovementioned 6000 qubits to be reached around 2026 to 2027. Even with somewhat
slower developments, one must assume that this will be the case from the year 2030.
Although attacks against symmetric cryptosystems using quantum computers and
algorithms by Grover or Simon (see [3] and [4]) are more effective than attacks using
conventional computers, it is currently assumed that doubling the effective key
length cancels out this advantage of quantum computers. Thus, for example,
AES256 would be about as secure against a quantum computer as AES128 is against
conventional computers.
Assuming the availability of sufficiently powerful quantum computers in the near
future, it is obvious to use them not only as a tool to attack classical crypto methods,
but also to investigate how quantum computer-resistant crypto methods could be
realized with their help. The use of quantum computers to perform certain
cryptographic operations is called quantum cryptography. Corresponding operations
typically exploit the quantum properties of superposition, interference, and
entanglement, which are not reproducible by classical computers. Quantumenhanced security [17] is then understood to be the extension of classical nonquantum systems that make use of or are augmented by quantum technology to
improve their ability to secure their data and transactions against adversaries that
may be fully quantum capable.
While quantum key distribution (QKD) (see [18], [19]) is often equated with
(general) quantum cryptography, QKD is based on the Vernam one-time pad and is
therefore more suitable only for key exchange and encryption. Quantum researchers
have introduced several quantum digital signature schemes (see [20] - [22]), but since
they typically refer to QKD, they would be better referred to as data authentication
schemes. As of this writing, we are unable to identify any quantum digital signature
schemes in the literature that actually have the necessary constructs of a digital
signature scheme and are EUF-CMA secure (existentially unforgeable under chosen
message attack), let alone post-quantum secure.
Based on the above considerations classic cryptographic methods such as RSA and
ECDSA with very large keys are ruled out (in the medium term) and can at best be
used for a short transition phase (i.e., for the next 9 years at most). Signatures
generally have a rather short lifetime and in principle only need to be secure up to
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the time of their verification. If a signature procedure can be broken by a quantum
computer in the future, today's signature certificates will probably already have
expired. Only in the case of very long validity periods for signature keys should
caution already be exercised. According to the current state of research, quantumenhanced processes do not (yet) play a role specifically for electronic signatures. In
the medium and long term, therefore, the focus should be on PQC processes.
3

Parameterized evaluation of PQC methods and applications

The objective of this study is not to replicate NIST's research in the NIST PQC
competition (see [23], [24])., but to build on it and make it more concrete in order
to find a basis for assessing the concrete practical applicability of a procedure in
building blocks of e-business applications. In doing so, we extend the evaluation
scheme from [2]. We define the three value ranges Small (S), Medium (M), and Large
(L) for different parameters of the procedures, respectively. Specifically, we consider
the following parameters.


Key Generation Resources (KeyGen() Resources)




Key sizes of the public and private keys
Key Lifetime: Certain signature processes only allow the private signature
key to be used for a limited number of signature creations. We record this
using the "key lifetime".
Resources for signature creation (Sign() resources) or encryption (Crypt()
resources).
Size of a signature (Signature Size) or size of a ciphertext (Cipher Size)
Time for the creation of a signature (Signature Time) or the creation of a
ciphertext (Crypt Time)
Resources for signature verification (Ver() resources) or decryption
(Decrypt() resources).






The parameters are categorized as follows in table 2 (assuming a single core of a
current Intel I7 processor for mobile devices running at 3.2 Ghz, as in [2] and [25]):
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Table 2: Parameters and their categories for evaluating the practical usability of PQC
methods in applications

KeyGen() Resources
Sign() Resources
Crypt() Resources
Ver() Resources
Decrypt() Resources
Key Size
Signature Size
Cipher Size
Key Lifetime
Signature Time
Crypt Time

Small (Optimal)
can be executed
on a chip card. (<
3M cycles)

Medium
executable on a
terminal/mobile
phone (< 30 M
cycles)

Large
Requires
operation on a
powerful laptop
(> 30 M cycles)

< 2Kbits (e.g.
ECC-P256)

< 2Kbytes (e.g.
RSA-8192)

> 2Kbytes

< 1000 signatures
per key
< 1ms per
signature
< 1ms per
encryption

< 10000000
signatures per key
< 100ms per
signature
< 100ms per
encryption

unlimited
> 100ms per
signature
> 100ms per
encryption

In order to evaluate the suitability of different PQC methods for concrete
applications, we first look at the applications from the ETSI (see [26]) and now use
the parameters described above as the requirements of the applications for a PQC
procedure to be deployed (the parameters are therefore no longer descriptive in
nature but have a requirement character). Of course, there are other use cases for
asymmetric (signature) procedures, but the selection considered covers common
scenarios from the areas of finance (for business), infrastructure (for people and
devices), cloud & Internet (for business-to-business, business-to-consumer, peer-topeer, and Internet-of-Things interactions), and enterprise (for companies). Based on
[2] and [26], the following picture emerges in Table 3.
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Table 3: Parameter evaluation of typical use cases of asymmetric signature solutions
KeyGen()
Resource

3SKey
EMVSDA
EMVDDA
CA Key 2
ICAO 9303
GSM eSIM
TLS server
TLS client
Bitcoin M
FIDO 3
USB
signature
token 4
PGP/
SMIME
PAdES /
AES 5
QES 6
Code Sign

4

S
L

Private Public
Key
Sign() Signature Signature Ver()
Key
Key
Lifetime Resource
Size
Time Resource
Size
Size
M
M
M
S
M
M
L
L

S

L

L

S

L

M

S

S

S

M

S

S

S

M

L

L

M

M

L

L

L

M

L

L

S

S

L

S

L

M

L

S

M

S

S

M

M

S

L

L

L

L

L

L

S

M

M

L

L

L

M

L

M

L

L

L

L

M

M

M

M

L

M

L

L

M

M

L

M

L

M

L

L

M

M

L

M

L

M

L

L

L

M

L

M

M

L

L

M

L

L

M

M

M

S
L

M
L

M
L

M
M

S
L

M
L

M
L

M
M

Status of standardization

To facilitate the development of new quantum computer-resistant and practical
methods, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) initiated a
standardization process in 2016 (see [7]). After an evaluation and selection process
based on public feedback and internal review by NIST, those methods were
identified to move to the third round of review as finalists [16]: The encryption and
key agreement/transmission methods are Classic McEliece [30], CRYSTALS-

2 Simplified consideration for qualified trust service providers
3 We consider FIDO

and other tokens with comparable computational power and memory for strong authentication
Here we consider signature tokens that are more powerful than common smart cards.
5 advanced electronic signatures when using a document server with HSM to sign documents
6 qualified electronic signatures when using a signature creation device such as a smart card or USB token
4
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KYBER [31]], NTRU [32], [33] and SABER [25]. The finalists for digital signatures
are CRYSTALS-DILITHIUM [27], FALCON [28] and Rainbow [29].
A special feature are so-called stateful hash-based signatures, a special class of
signature schemes with certain restrictions, from which currently XMSS (eXtended
Merkle Signature Scheme) [8] and LMS (Leighton-Micali Signatures) [9] are in the
process of standardization at the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and at
NIST, so that standards can be expected earlier than in the above-mentioned PQC
process at NIST. The use cases mentioned are code signing and issuing PKI root
certificates from certification authorities.
The standardization organizations ETSI and ISO are also involved in PQC
standardization with their own working groups. At present, however, it looks as if
ETSI and ISO will rely on NIST for the initial selection of procedures. At the
moment it seems rather unlikely that other fundamentally new procedures not yet
considered by NIST will emerge as part of the (international) standardization effort.
In this study, we therefore restrict ourselves to the above mentioned candidates and
go on to investigate their suitability for e-business applications.
5

Evaluation of the procedures

We apply the parameter description introduced in Section 3 to the procedures listed
above. According to [2], we obtain the following parameter profiles for the current
favorites of the NIST and IETF standardization of PQC signature methods in Table
4:
Table 4: Parameter profiles for PQC signature methods

KeyGen() resource
Private Key Size
Public Key Size
Key Lifetime
Sign() resource
Signature Size
Signature Time
Ver() Resources

CRYSTALSDILITHIUM
S
L
M
L
M
M
S
S

FALCON

Rainbow

XMSS

LMS

M
M
M
L
S
S
S
S

L
L
L
L
S
S
S
S

L
S
M
M
M
M
M
S

L
S
S
M
S
M
S
S
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For encryption methods and key exchange or key transport (KEM) methods, we
combine the results from [38, Table 3] with the evaluation method from [2] and
obtain the following parameter profiles for the current favorites of NIST's
standardization in Table 5:
Table 5: Parameter profiles for PQC encryption methods and key exchange/key transport
methods

KeyGen() resource
Private Key Size
Public Key Size
Crypt() resource
Cipher Size
Crypt Time
Decrypt() resources

Classic
McEliece
S
L
M
M
M
S
S

CRYSTAL-KYBER

NTRU

SABER

L
S
S
S
S
S
S

L
L
L
S
S
S
S

L
S
M
M
M
M
S

If we contrast the parameterization of the procedures with the parameterization of
the applications from Table 3, we can derive an evaluation scheme as in [2] based
on a point assignment for the suitability of the procedures for the respective
application. The basis of scoring is as follows: If the procedure provides a score for
a single parameter that is equal to or better than what the application provides, then
the score remains unchanged. If the procedure for a parameter is worse by a range
(e.g. M instead of S) than what the application allows, then 1 is subtracted from the
score for each such parameter7. If there is a parameter for which the procedure is
two ranges worse (e.g., L instead of S) than what the application allows, then we
consider the procedure to be not fit (NF = not fit). For quantitative purposes, we
assign a score of -100 for each NF. Then the individual ratings of the parameters are
summed up. The most suitable procedures can now be found for each application.
A score of zero means that no changes are required and the process can most likely
be used for the application. A negative score means that the procedure is not
completely suitable, but that optimizations for the procedure may need to be found.
After zero, the algorithm with the highest score (i.e., with the lowest negative score)

For each individual parameter, the context determines whether a larger or smaller value is better. For example, a
larger memory requirement is worse, but a longer lifetime of a key may be better.
7
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is the next most suitable, as it requires the least number of changes to be used by the
application.
Table 6: Selection of suitable processes per application

3SKey
EMV-SDA
EMV DDA
CA Key
ICAO 9303
GSM eSIM
TLS server
TLS Client
Bitcoin
FIDO
USB
signature
PGP
token
PDF-AES 8
PDF QES 9
Code sign
Points

CRYSTALSDILITHIUM
-2
-2
NF
0
-2
NF
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-2
0
-208

FALCON

Rainbow

XMSS

LMS

-1
-1
-3
0
-1
-1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-1
0
-8

NF
NF
NF
-1
NF
NF
0
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
NF
0
-606

NF
-2
NF
0
-2
-1
-2
-2
-2
-1
-1
-2
-1
NF
0
-315

NF
-2
NF
0
-1
0
-1
-2
-2
-1
-1
-2
-1
NF
0
-312

As a result no PQC method currently considered is suitable for all mentioned use
cases in Table 3 (in particular for replacing RSA and EC in all use cases). For various
use cases, such as for root CA keys, for code signing or for applications where
signature creation and verification are performed on a powerful PC, the PQC
procedures currently considered in the NIST standardization can be used. This also
applies, with minor restrictions, to the use of tokens that are more powerful than
"usual" smart cards such as signature cards. However, it becomes critical if the
procedure is to be executed on hardware with limited computing power, such as a
smart card. Thus, there are at least approaches for a first solution in the eIDAS
context if not a completely satisfactory answer to the upcoming developments.

8
9

when using a document server with HSM for signing documents
when using a signature creation device such as a smartcard or USB token
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Recommendations

Post-quantum cryptography will become the standard in the long term [1].
Consideration should be given at an early stage, as part of a measured risk
management process, as to whether and when a switch to quantum computing
resistant methods should be made (depending on the application) [1]. Especially in
connection with signatures with a medium validity period of the certificates (3-5
years), there is no need to rush. For cryptographic applications that process
information with long secrecy periods and high protection requirements, however,
there may already be a need for action now [1]. The danger here is that messages for
key negotiation and the data encrypted with the negotiated keys are collected in
advance and decrypted in the future with the aid of a quantum computer ("store
now, decrypt later"). Caution is also required with very long validity periods for
signature keys. It is therefore already necessary to discuss how a migration to postquantum cryptography to a Fully Quantum Safe Cryptographic State (FQSCS) for
e-business applications can be initiated today.
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